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U.S. POLICY TOWARDS GUATEMALA
IN THE YEARS 1944-1954
After World War II the United States was planning to focus on Europe, the Middle 
East and the Far East. Latin America was safe, in their opinion. So the events in 
Guatemala, called the “Guatemalan Revolution,” surprised politicians in Washington. 
Fear of communists, strengthened by the Korean War and the political activity of 
Senator Joseph McCarthy, was the main reason for the change of policy towards 
Guatemala. Corporations, concerned about their wealth, stirred up tensions. The 
domino theory made officials in the United States see a direct threat to their political 
system and domination in the Western Hemisphere. Therefore they saw the neces­
sity of action.
REASONS FOR DISCONTENT
Starting at the beginning of the 1930s, Guatemala was ruled for fourteen years by 
Dictator Jorge Ubico Castaneda. Opposing the demands of workers and Native Indi­
ans to increase wages and welfare, he kept his position due to support from the 
oligarchy and foreign corporations.1 His policy effected the archaic ownership sys­
tem still present in Guatemala - 142 possessors hold in their hands 98 percent of the 
land (Dent 1999: 198). Such a situation caused social discontent, which led to the 
overthrow of the dictator in 1944. The revolutionary leaders were army officers 
- Colonel Jacobo Arbenz Guzman and Francisco Arana cooperating with Juan José 
Arévalo and Jorge Toriello. As a result of the “October Revolution,” junta took over 
power and ordered elections in 1945, in which Juan José Arévalo, a popular litera­
ture and philosophy professor, won.
1 In Guatemala most of the banana production market embraced the United Fruit Com­
pany (UFC); the International Railways of Central America (IRCA) controlled nearly the whole 
railway system, Electric Bond and Share (EBS) controlled the entire electrical infrastructure.
The newly elected head of state introduced reforms, which improved the state, 
changed the political system, upheld the freedom of speech and introduced laws 
restoring freedom of press and allowing the establishment of political parties. He
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recognized the postulates of the labor unions and dealt with them kindly. Then new 
government took care of improving the standards of living (Dent 1999; 199). In 1947 
Guatemala’s parliament passed a law announcing the control and restriction of the 
United Fruit Company and other companies’ activities on Guatemalan land (Smith 
1983: 44).
Ardvalo began a landowner reform which was continued by his successor, 
elected at the beginning of November 1950, Col. Jacobo Arbenz Guzman. Early in 
1952 he went even further, carrying out expropriation of noncultivated land, which 
he distributed among farmers. In 1953 Arbenz Guzman’s government decided to 
temporarily take over two concerns: the Guatemalan Electric Company and the In­
ternational Railways of Central America. In March of the same year, 234,000 acres of 
land belonging to the UFC was expropriated, giving to the company bonds worth 
627,572 dollars, while the company representatives estimated the land’s value at 
15,854,849 million. In February of the next year, 172,532 acres of the company’s land 
were taken over (Smith 1996: 135). Jacobo Arbenz Guzman continued reforms, in­
creasing taxes transferred to health care, implementing welfare programs and pro­
viding employees with new rights (Smith 1994: 74).
ANSWER IN AMERICAN STYLE
Although the United States was engaged in World War II, politicians carefully ob­
served the events in Guatemala and became concerned by the moves of President 
Ardvalo. In 1948 the position of U.S. Ambassador to the country was given to Rich­
ard C. Patterson, a fierce anti-communist.2 Just before taking his post, he wrote to 
Samuel Zemurray, chairman of the UFC: „1 want you to know that I am giving my 
undivided attention to trying to protect and promote American interests” (Smith 
1994: 75). In the spring of 1950 Patterson returned to the U.S., ending his mission as 
American Ambassador, facing complaints from the Guatemalan government that he 
had been interfering in domestic affairs and that he had believed that communists 
were threatening his life.
2 Patterson is the author of so called “duck test” - The duck test works this way: suppose 
you see a bird walking around in a farm yard. This bird wears no label that says, “duck.” But 
the bird certainly looks like duck. Also, he goes to the pond and you notice that he swims 
like a duck. Then he opens his beak and quacks like a duck. Well, by this time you have 
probably reached the conclusion that the bird is a duck, whether he’s wearing a label or not 
(see: Dent 1999: 209).
In March 1948 Gen. Federico Ponce came to the State Department (in 1944 he 
had declared himself the president of Guatemala) in the company of American ad­
venturer John Rendon, asking for assistance in overthrowing Ardvalo, which was 
supposed to protect the Western Hemisphere from the communist penetration. In 
response they heard that any violence would be a violation of inter-American com­
mitments. Moreover, the U.S. government would do “everything within its power to 
discourage revolutionary activities” (Smith 1994: 74). At the same time President 
Ardvalo was officially accused of “lack of concern” for traditional good relations with 
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the United States because he was giving “cooperation and assistance to pro­
Communist elements in Guatemala national life” (Smith 1994: 74).
The new Ambassador, Rudolf Schoenfeld, conducted a more rational policy, try­
ing to appease arisen contradictions. In spite of the difficult situation, economic 
cooperation continued. It was written in a policy statement on May 13, 1949 that it 
was advisable to continue former assistance in modernization programs in Guate­
mala.
Gaddis Smith writes that starting in 1949 Americans waged unofficial, diplomatic 
and economic war with Guatemala. At the forefront of it was Edward G. Miller, Jr., 
assistant secretary for inter-American affairs. Devoted to the Monroe Doctrine, he 
said in 1950 that Americans “consider any attempt to extend the Communist system 
to any portions of this hemisphere as ‘dangerous to our peace and safety’” (Smith 
1994: 71).
In the State Department Soviet Union specialist, George F. Kennan, had quite 
a different opinion on the question of necessary action. After a short trip to Latin- 
American countries, he came to the conclusion that political culture in the region 
was too weak to successfully confront communism. That is why he wrote in March: 
“we cannot be too dogmatic about the methods by which local communists can be 
dealt with (...) where the concepts and traditions of popular government are too 
weak to absorb successfully the intensity of communist attack, then we must con­
cede that harsh measures of government repression may be (...) the only alternative 
to further communist success” (Dent 1999: 200). However, his opinion was not the 
official policy line.
In Congress criticism was heard, attacking President Truman for his relatively too 
soft policy in this situation. They put forward the slogan predicting the loss of Gua­
temala, referring to the loss of China to the communists. Despite this, the govern­
ment still acted with restraint. In May 1950 Thomas Corcoran, a UFC representative, 
asked the State Department if he should put up his own candidate in the forthcom­
ing elections in Guatemala. Thomas C. Mann, director of Middle American Division, 
told him that such attempts would be ineffective, causing only public outcry in Latin 
American countries and in the United States. To the suggestion that corporations 
could try to affect election results on their own, Mann answered that such action 
would not only deteriorate his [Corcoran] clients’ situation, but would also cause 
additional problems.
In February 1952 IRCA’s chairman came to the State Department, saying that 
“communist infiltration in Guatemala is a modern day violation of the Monroe Doc­
trine, just as serious as physical intervention of a foreign government in Latin Amer­
ica was in the 19th century” (Smith 1994: 77). Miller answered that the Monroe Doc­
trine was currently recognized by the U.S. government as the inter-American system 
and any interventions were out of the question, while more open involvement of the 
Soviets or proof of their military presence would exert an eventual change of the 
political line of the United States.
On June 12, 1952, the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs recommended limiting aid 
programs, abstaining from new commitments and to introducing lower exportation 
quotas for some products. However, it advised subtle actions in order to avoid accu­
sations of the return to the “big stick” policy (Smith 1983: 47). The measures were 
taken in order to put pressure on the government of Guatemala and persuade it to 
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take a less radical line of changes introduced in the country. These measures were 
supposed to be sufficient for Arbenz Guzman to understand the message and re­
think his stance.
OPERATION FORTUNE
During his visit to the United States in April 1952, Anastasio Somoza presented 
a plan according to which the CIA and UFC would help him overthrow Arbenz 
Guzman. The coup, under the codename of Operation Fortune, would be carried 
out by forces formed by Guatemalan exiles, led by Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas. By 
administration workers ‘Rufus’ (Armas’s pseudonym) “was judged to be the only one 
with ‘sufficient prestige, character, and ability to organize and lead a successful 
revolution.’” Operational plans were authorized and the invasion was scheduled to 
take place on the 15th of November with the assistance of the other regional coun­
tries. On the day when the ship leaden with arms set out to New Orleans, the State 
Department refused to give it authorization. During a meeting in the department 
with the CIA’s representative, the refusal was sustained, on the basis that it wasn’t 
a revolutionary moment. Action was postponed till March of the next year, but it 
was restrained by an attempted revolt in Salama held by Carlos Simmons’ group. 
The agency reports indicated that the spirit to fight was weakened as a consequence 
of arrests in Guatemala. Because of this, the plan had no chances of success. It was 
recommended to take another chance in four to six months (http://www.state. 
gov/r/pa/ho/frus/ ike/guat/20195. htm).
OPERATION SUCCESS
The assumption of power by Dwight Eisenhower meant tightening of the course 
towards Guatemala. The president exerted pressure on Arbenz Guzman to get rid of 
communists from his government and labor unions. To make his point of view clear, 
he designated John Peurifoy, another fierce anti-communist, as the American Ambas­
sador to Guatemala. After meeting with the Guatemalan head of state in October 
1953, the ambassador wrote: “I came away definitely convinced that if President 
[Arbenz] is not a Communist, he will certainly do until one comes along, and the 
normal approaches will not work in Guatemala” (Smith 2005: 120).
In March 1953, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles went to the tenth Inter­
American Conference in Caracas, with a decision to force resolution condemning 
external intervention by international communism. As a matter of fact, a ‘Declaration 
of Solidarity’ was passed, criticizing the aggressive policy carried out by international 
communism, but the Guatemalan case was not mentioned, which had been Dulles’s 
main concern (Smith 2005: 121).
In April, John Moors Cabot, Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America, after 
the meeting with Arbenz came to the conclusion that he was committed to commu­
nism. Therefore he recommended collective action undertaken by the Organization 
of American States (OAS). In September he changed his mind, writing: “I realized 
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that no such action was remotely possible. After much soul-searching I went to Be­
dell Smith and said I thought a CIA-organized coup was the only solution. He nod­
ded and smiled, and I got the impression that the plan was already under way (...) 
My principal concern was to keep secret any United States involvement in projected 
coup” (Smith 1994: 80).
Again in the USA voices were heard criticizing events in Central America. The 
press wrote that the failure to hold back communists’ progress in Guatemala would 
mean the waste of American soldiers’ lives in Korea. A democratic congressman 
from Montana, Mike Mansfield, alarmed that the situation was “dangerous in its im­
plications to the peace and welfare of the Western Hemisphere,” expecting that the 
State Department in collaboration with the OAS would “take the necessary steps to 
consider what can be done to bring democracy back to Guatemala and a fair deal to 
American investors in that country” (Smith 1983: 49).
Before Dulles’s trip to Caracas, a team of people whose assignment was to pre­
pare a coup in Guatemala was called into being in the CIA, the codename of which 
was Operation PBSUCCESS. Among people engaged in these plans were Allen Dul­
les - head of the CIA, Richard E. Bissell, E. Howard Hunt, David Phillips, J.C. King, 
Adolf Berle and Thomas C. Mann. A small group of Guatemalan exiles was formed, 
equipped and trained in camps in Honduras and Nicaragua. At the same time Presi­
dent Arbenz Guzman tried to obtain arms for his army, the United States refused him 
the sale. This led him to turn in 1954 to the government of Czechoslovakia. The 
Swedish ship Alfhelm came to Guatemala on May 15, with a cargo of arms from 
Czechoslovakia. Then, at a conference J.F. Dulles said that “a government in which 
Communist influence is very strong has come into a position to dominate militarily 
the Central America area” (Smith 2005: 121). The Guatemalan head of state was then 
called “Red Jacobo.”
Operation Success was given a green light. In June, the team composed of about 
150 people, led by Col. Carlos Castillo Armas, headed towards Guatemala. Insur­
gents were supported from the air by bombers provided by the CIA and piloted by 
private pilots, hired for that purpose. During the fight the CIA broadcasted anti- 
presidential propaganda through the newly-created radio station Voice of Liberation. 
A retired actor was hired to prepare the radio scripts for the Guatemalan people. 
Hunt contacted the New York cardinal Francis Spellman, who enabled contact with 
Guatemalan priests, who then prepared a pastoral letter to people without access to 
the radio. The message was then dropped over the country by CIA planes (Chap­
man 2007: 135-136). The invasion began on June 18, 1954.
At the same time, in the United Nations the American representative, Henry 
Cabot Lodge, effectively countered a revision of the Guatemala case by the Security 
Council. Guatemala made a suggestion to send observers, because the invasion 
forces were approaching from Honduras and Nicaragua. In answer to that, Brazil 
and Columbia proposed a motion that the problem should be examined by OAS. 
The resolution wasn’t accepted because of the veto raised by Soviet Ambassador 
Semyon Tsarapkin, who insisted that Guatemala wouldn’t find justice in an organi­
zation dominated by the U.S.A. France proposed a ceasefire resolution, which didn’t 
obtain unanimous support. On June 22, Guatemala put forward a motion to sum­
mon another assembly of the Security Council. Lodge delayed two days and then 
called for the meeting, not to examine the case, however, but only to consider en­
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tering it in the agenda. France and Great Britain insisted on hearing the Guatemalan 
delegate, but they gave up after hearing the argument that the United States, militar­
ily engaged in Central America, would not be able to get involved in other regions 
of the world (France was engaged then in Indochina and Great Britain on Cyprus). 
The case of Guatemala was not part of the agenda on that day.
On July 7, the United States called for an assembly meeting of foreign ministers 
of OAS member countries, to which the representatives of Brazil, Costa Rica, Cuba, 
the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua and Pern came. The main pur­
pose of the session was to accuse Guatemala of aggression against Honduras and 
bringing about a communist treat to America. The U.S. announced sending to Gua­
temala an OAS peace mission, which admission advertised President Arbenz, but it 
stopped in Mexico because of a bombing raid launched by invasion forces.
Jacobo Arbenz Guzman, convinced that rebel forces were coming from every di­
rection, resigned on the June 28, 1954. Power in Guatemala was seized by Col. Cas­
tillo Armas, in a short time withdrawing changes carried out in the years 1944-1954. 
He ordered the arrest of suspected communists, renegotiated contracts signed with 
the UFC and other corporations, called back land reform and sharpened regulations 
of labor unions’ activities. Under a Preventive Penal Law Against Communism he 
established the National Committee of Defense Against Communism, which could 
sentence a person to death for activities such as sabotage or membership in trade 
unions (Smith 1994: 138).
John Foster Dulles denied any connections between United States and the over­
throw of the Guatemalan head of state, defining this action as strictly internally in­
spired. As for the CIA, it had performed an example of a perfectly planned and suc­
cessfully ended action, which it repeated over the next years.
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